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IT’S GOOD FOR THE PLANET AND IT’S GOOD FOR YOUR PORTFOLIO: 




RACHEL BAKER MANN1 
 
Investors are demanding greener and cleaner investment options. These values-based investors 
are increasingly pursing a strategy known as ESG, where a company’s environmental, social, 
and governance decisions are included in the overall investment process. This strategy is 
especially popular among millennials, who are particularly concerned about climate change and 
other social justice issues. In a recent survey, 90% of millennials stated they would be interested 
in an ESG option in their 401(k) retirement plan lineup. Yet, only 3% of employers offer one.  
 
Employers’ reticence to offer an ESG option is understandable in light of Department of Labor 
regulations that suggest doing so might violate the strict fiduciary requirements under the 
federal law regulating employee benefit plans (known as ERISA.) The Department of Labor 
justified this regulation by suggesting that ESG is a suspect strategy that values a positive impact 
on the planet over maximizing financial returns. But long-term research into ESG investing 
shows this concern is unwarranted—ESG investments perform as well, and sometimes better 
than, non-ESG investments, which makes sense when you understand the ESG strategy to be 
simply another layer of investment analysis and risk management.  
 
ESG investing does not violate any of ERISA’s fiduciary requirements. To the contrary, ESG 
investing offers values-based investors the rare win-win—it is good for the planet, and it is good 
for their retirement portfolio. The Department of Labor should re-write the ESG regulations 
accordingly to encourage more employers to offer an ESG option. In turn, offering an ESG 
option may encourage more millennials to participate in their 401(k)s, saving more for 
retirement while also providing a market incentive for companies to get greener. An ESG 
investment option in a 401(k) plan lineup would be good for a portfolio and good for the planet. 
 
1 J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Allison 
Hoffman, Tom Baker, Amy Monahan, and Jonathan Mann for their thoughtful guidance and revisions. Love to Jack 
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Imagine the stereotypical millennial—what comes to mind? Do you think of avocado 
toast?2 Side parts and skinny jeans?3 Maybe you think of the recent runup of GameStop and the 
increasing popularity of millennial investing websites like Robinhood,4 or the millennial (and 
Gen-Z) dominated protests for climate change5 and racial equity.6 
Stereotypes aside, one of the defining features of the millennial generation is its focus on 
corporate values and sustainability. 71% report feeling their lives are immediately threatened by 
climate change.7 70% of millennials actively consider a company’s values when making a 
purchase, as compared with 52% of all adults.8 90% say they want to tailor their investments to 
their values.9 
Millennials’ focus on sustainability and values-based investing is no surprise, given the 
increasing threat of climate change that looms over this generation. But many millennials, and 
Americans in general, do not have access to a sustainable investment option that might accord 
with their values. For more than 20% of Americans, their only form of investment vehicle is their 
401(k),10 and only 3% of employers offer a sustainable investment option in their 401(k) 
lineup.11 It is possible that encouraging more employers to offer sustainable investment options 
 
2 Sam Levin, Millionaire Tells Millennials: If you Want a House, Stop Buying Avocado Toast, THE GUARDIAN (May 
15, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/may/15/australian-millionaire-millennials-avocado-toast-
house. 
3 Erica Tempesta, Millennials Go to War with Gen Z Over Skinny Jeans and Side Parts, THE DAILY MAIL (Feb. 5, 
2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/lifestyle/lifestyle-buzz/millennials-go-to-war-with-gen-z-over-skinny-jeans-and-
side-parts/ar-BB1dr8l3.  
4 Miles Brignall, How GameStop Traders Fired the First Shot in Millennials’ War on Wall Street, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/jan/30/how-gamestop-traders-fired-the-first-shots-in-
millenials-war-on-wall-street; Dave Fogel, Millennials and the Robinhood Revolution, American Bar Ass’n: After 
the Bar, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/after-the-bar/student-loans-and-
finances/millennials-robinhood-revolution/.  
5 Matthew Ballew, Jennifer Marlon, et al, Young Adults, Across Party Lines, Are More Willing to Take Climate 
Action, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION (April 28, 2020), 
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/young-adults-climate-activism/.  
6 Ruth Milkman, A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of Protest, 82(1) AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL R. 1, 1 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122416681031.  
7 Climate Change Will Still Matter to Gen Z & Millennials—Here’s How We Know, YPULSE (April 22, 2020), 
https://www.ypulse.com/article/2020/04/22/climate-change-will-still-matter-to-gen-z-millennials-heres-how-we-
know/.  
8 Anjali Lai, Millennials Call for Values-Driven Companies, But They’re Not the Only Ones Interested, FORBES 
(May 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forrester/2018/05/23/millennials-call-for-values-driven-companies-
but-theyre-not-the-only-ones-interested/?sh=1a6d0d7d5464.  




10 GARY MOTTOLA, A SNAPSHOT OF INVESTOR HOUSEHOLDS IN AMERICA, FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION 
FOUNDATION (Sept. 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fixed-income-advisory-committee/finra-
investor-education-foundation-investor-households-fimsa-040918.pdf.  




in their 401(k) lineups could encourage more millennials, who are vastly under saving for 
retirement,12 to participate more and contribute in greater amounts to their 401(k)s. 
Millennials are not the only group interested in sustainable investing. A sustainable 
investment strategy known as “ESG investing” is popular across all generations. Individual and 
institutional investors are increasingly promoting ESG investing. This strategy involves 
identifying companies that have a positive impact on the planet (using certain environmental, 
social, and governance, or “ESG”, factors) and then directing assets towards those companies, 
either through purchasing individual stocks or bonds, or through building and buying ESG-
friendly funds.13  
Currently, a third of all U.S. professionally managed assets are held in funds using some 
form of ESG investing strategy, to the tune of $17 trillion dollars.14 And over $1.7 trillion are 
invested directly in ESG funds15 (not all funds using ESG strategies self-identify as an “ESG 
fund.”)16 But these dollars invested in ESG funds are overwhelming in taxable accounts, and are 
almost exclusively not in retirement accounts. In fact, less than 0.1% of total 401(k) assets (less 
than $9 billion) are invested in ESG funds.17 ESG is vastly underrepresented in 401(k) plans. 
The discrepancy between taxable assets invested in funds using ESG investing strategies 
and employer-sponsored retirement assets invested in ESG-type funds is because of a lack of 
ESG-friendly 401(k) investment options. Fewer than 3% of employers offer an ESG investment 
in their 401(k) lineup.18 The dearth of ESG in 401(k) plans makes it harder for employees to 
access ESG and likely makes 401(k) plans less desirable savings vehicles for values-based 
investors, such as many millennials. This lack of ESG access for retirement plan investors is due 
to the Trump-era Department of Labor’s strict regulation of retirement plan fiduciaries, and the 
current regulatory framework around what type of investments are allowed in employer-
sponsored, participant-direct retirement plans.  
A Trump Administration U.S Department of Labor regulation19 entitled “Financial 
Factors for Selecting Plan Investments,” —also known as the ESG Rule20— increases the burden 
upfront for retirement plan providers who want to offer an ESG option in their lineup by 
 
12 Employment Alert: Young Workers Face Hard Times in Retirement, 1 EMP. ALERT 11, 28 (Jan. 14, 2011), 
available at 
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I873fa4701d7c11e08b05fdf15589d8e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=D
efault&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 (finding that millennials are at the highest risk of retirement 
insecurity compared to older generations, and predicting that eight out of ten millennials will not be able to meet 
their financial needs in retirement without significant changes in their saving and investing behaviors.) 
13 Alana Benson, ESG Investing: A Beginner’s Guide, NERDWALLET (April 6, 20201), 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/esg-investing.  
14 PARNASSUS INVESTMENTS, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 1 (2020), 
https://www.ussif.org/files/Trends%20Report%202020%20Executive%20Summary.pdf. 
15 Simon Jessop & Elizabeth Howcroft, Sustainable Fund Assets hit Record $1.7 Trillion in 2020: Morningstar, 
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-funds-sustainable/sustainable-fund-assets-hit-
record-1-7-trln-in-2020-morningstar-idUSKBN29X2NM.  
16 Sophie Baker, Global ESG-data Driven Assets Hit $40.5 trillion, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.pionline.com/esg/global-esg-data-driven-assets-hit-405-trillion.  
17 Greg Iacurci, Climate Funds Hold Less than 1% of 401(k) Money. Here’s Why, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/11/heres-why-401k-plans-lag-in-green-investment-options.html. 
18 Id. 
19 Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 29 C.F.R. 2509, available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/13/2020-24515/financial-factors-in-selecting-plan-investments.  
20 Maureen J. Gorman & Debra B. Hoffman, The Department of Labor’s ESG-less Final ESG Rule, MAYER BROWN: 
BENEFITS & COMPENSATION BLOG (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.usbenefits.law/2020/11/the-dol-final-esg-rule/ 
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requiring them to excessively document the process and rationale upfront for selecting a fund 
relying on “non pecuniary” factors, such as ESG. The Labor Department justified this strict 
regulation of ESG investing by centering it within the narrow focus that the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) takes towards ensuring retirement security. To 
ensure that workers’ retirement savings are adequately managed, ERISA sets out strict fiduciary 
duties of loyalty solely to the plan beneficiaries and prudence as to the process of selecting and 
monitoring fiscally responsible investment options.21 But ruling out ESG funds for fiduciary 
reasons is flawed for (at least) two reasons.  
First, this justification sets up a false dichotomy between good financial returns and ESG 
factors. It fails to recognize that employers and their fiduciaries can increase retirement saving 
through allowing values-based investing. A well-selected ESG investment option has as much of 
a chance of providing positive returns as a well-selected non ESG investment option.22 It is 
neither disloyal to the plan participant nor fiscally imprudent to offer a well-managed and 
thoughtfully constructed ESG investment option that will both provide excellent returns for the 
beneficiary and have a positive impact on global sustainability. 
Second, this justification takes too narrow of a look at how fiduciaries can facilitate 
retirement security for employees. It is insufficient to focus solely on risk/return of plan 
participants without also encouraging employees to opt into the plan in the first place. If 
millennials are choosing not to invest in their retirement plan, but are using apps like Robinhood 
to direct values-based investments using other discretionary funds,23 fiduciaries can entice these 
values-based millennial investors to continue to invest in sustainable business, but with tax-
advantaged retirement savings and an employer match instead.24 
ESG investing is particularly attractive to millennials, a generation that has been hard hit 
both by increased climate change and increased retirement insecurity.25 According to recent 
surveys, millennial investors are twice as likely as the general investor population to invest in 
companies with ESG related goals.26 90% of millennial investors stated they want an ESG option 
in their 401(k) plan.27 Many of these values-driven millennials are also not adequately saving for 
retirement, and at least a small portion of them are under saving in their 401(k)s because they are 
 
21 https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-24515/p-36.  
22 Madison Sargis & Patrick Wang, How Does Investing in ESG Companies Affect Returns, MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 19, 
2020), https://www.morningstar.com/insights/2020/02/19/esg-companies 
23 Dave Fogel, Millennials and the Robinhood Revolution, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N: AFTER THE BAR, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/after-the-bar/student-loans-and-
finances/millennials-robinhood-revolution/.  
24 The Tax Benefits of Your 401(k) Plan, TURBOTAX, (2020), https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tips/investments-and-
taxes/the-tax-benefits-of-your-401k-plan/L8QHCzbiO.  
25 THE DELOITTE GLOBAL MILLENNIAL SURVEY 2020 3, 7, 9-11 (2020), available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/millennialsurvey.html; Audrey Choi, How 
Younger Investors Could Reshape the World, MORGAN STANLEY: WEALTH MANAGEMENT (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/access/why-millennial-investors-are-different (“In 2012, 31 percent of millennials 
participated in an employer-sponsored program, whether a defined benefit plan such as a pension or a defined 
contribution plan such as a 401(k).4 About half of Gen Xers participated in a plan that year, while 56 percent of 
baby boomers took part in one. Though traditional pensions were once the more typical way to build retirement 
income, participation rates for defined benefit plans varied in a relatively narrow range, rising from 6 percent for 
millennials to 13 percent for boomers. Participation rates in defined contribution plans rose more dramatically by 





saving in other types of investment vehicles.28 Providing a greener and cleaner ESG option in 
their tax-advantaged retirement plans could redirect millennial investment dollars into 401(k)s, 
encouraging millennials to save more towards retirement and facilitating ERISA’s overall goal of 
ensuring retirement security for American workers.  
This article argues that, if new regulations lower the burden of offering an ESG option in 
a retirement plan lineup, retirement investors, particularly millennials, would likely redirect some 
or all of their retirement plan assets towards a sustainable investment option. This would not only 
be good for the planet, since it would direct more dollars towards companies with a sustainable 
footprint and incentivize other companies to get on board, but would be good for millennial 
retirement plan participants. Giving those investors a greener, cleaner retirement plan option 
aligned to their millennial values might prompt more millennials and other values-driven 
retirement plan investors to participate in greater numbers and invest in higher amounts in their 
retirement plans. Given the power of compound interest, even a marginal change in millennial 
participation in 401(k) plans as a result of increased access to ESG investing would have an 
outsized impact on their economic stability in retirement.   
While the 2021 Department of Labor recently announced a nonenforcement policy of the 
ESG Rule, a simple non enforcement of this rule does not go far enough to encourage plan 
fiduciaries to offer an ESG investment in their lineup. The Biden Administration should go 
further and issue a new ESG Rule that actively encourages plan fiduciaries to offer a fiscally 
responsible ESG fund in their lineup to encourage more millennial and other values-based 
investor participation and contribution to their retirement savings. 
It is important to note that this article does not pretend to offer an easy Labor Department 
regulatory fix to all of the millennial generation’s economic hardships. ESG investing will not 
somehow magically cure millennials of a debt crisis caused by ballooning costs of higher 
education and a depressed job market post Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. But 
marginal retirement investing at a young age has enormous returns, thanks to compound interest. 
And this regulatory change is a cheap and easy way to encourage a bit more saving, while also 
increasing investment in sustainable businesses and encouraging companies to care about climate 
change.  
Plenty has been written about ERISA’s regulation of plan investments, and in the past 
few years there have been strong pieces of scholarship on the role the Labor Department should 
play in regulating ESG in ERISA-regulated lineups.29 This article adds to the body of scholarship 
in two ways. First, it argues that ERISA and the Labor Department should actively encourage 
ESG investing, and that intelligent and modern approaches to ESG investing do not run afoul of 
ERISA’s duties of loyalty and prudence. Second, this article novelly suggests that lowering the 
burden, or even encouraging, fiduciaries to include ESG investment options in their plan lineup 
might encourage more retirement savings in general. 
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide background on ESG—the 
history of values-based investing, changing approaches to ESG investing, and increased 
individual and institutional investor appetite for ESG investment options.  
 
28 Generational Retirement Trends Study, T. ROWE PRICE (2015), at slide 12, available at 
https://www.slideshare.net/TRowePrice/generational-retirement-trends-study-2015/12-
1212By_Worker_GenerationMajor_Reasons_for.  
29 See generally Bernard Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38 YALE J. REG. BULLETIN 112 (2020); Max M. 
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of 
ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STANFORD L. REV. 381 (2020); Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: 
Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLORADO L. REV. 731 (2019). 
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Part II will dive into the marginal positive impacts that opening up access to retirement 
plan investing in ESG could have on retirement saving in general. This section will discuss the 
general retirement savings crisis in the United States, and the particular hurdles the millennial 
generation faces with retirement saving. This section will posit that allowing employees to invest 
their retirement savings into ESG funds could, on the margin, increase retirement savings, which 
for young employees could have a large financial impact thanks to compound interest.  
Part III will examine the relationship between ERISA, the Department of Labor, and ESG 
investing. This Part will discuss how ESG investing fits into ERISA’s regulation of fiduciaries, 
and suggest how fiduciaries could include ESG options in their lineups without running afoul of 
their fiduciary duties.  
Finally, Part IV will lay out recommendations to the incoming Biden Administration for 
how they can revise the Financial Factors rule to lower the burden, or even encourage, ERISA-
regulated fiduciaries to include an ESG option in their retirement plan investment lineup. 
I. A HISTORY OF ESG 
A. Defining ESG 
 What is colloquially referred to today as “ESG investing” has a number of different 
names. Some people refer to this type of investing as values-based investing, or responsible 
investing, or sustainable investing. In the past it was referred to as “socially responsible 
investing.” These different names all have the same core strategy—to consider facts that 
traditionally were not part of a classic financial analysis process, yet have broader relevance to 
the impact of a company on the environment. Many investors believe, and many studies have 
shown, that while these factors may not have been traditionally considered as part of the 
investment valuation process, they have significant financial relevance to the performance of the 
company. They may include how companies are responding to climate change, the size of their 
“carbon footprint”, how their health and safety policies work to protect their employees, how 
they treat workers more generally, or whether their corporate culture builds trust and spurs 
innovation.30 
While evidence of values-based investing can be traced back as early as the 1700s,31 this 
type of investing strategy took hold in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s in response to 
the Vietnam War and apartheid in South Africa. Back then, this type of values-based investing 
was coined “socially responsible investing”, or SRI.32 Activists called for boycotts and 
 
30 E. Napoletano & Benjamin Curry, Environmental, Social and Governance: What is ESG Investing?, FORBES: 
ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-
esg/?sh=19865b3d1695.  
31 The founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, warned his followers not to profit off of harmful business 
practices, such as alcohol, the slave trade, and the production of dangerous chemicals. Max Schanzenbach & Robert 
H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a 
Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 392 (2020). 
32 E. Napoletano & Benjamin Curry, Environmental, Social and Governance: What is ESG Investing?, FORBES: 




divestment from companies doing business in South Africa, or from companies who did not 
promise to abide by certain nondiscrimination principles in their South African operations.33 
 Values-based investment strategies and marketing has shifted since the 1970s. In addition 
to incorporating a company’s environmental and social impact into the valuation process, 
modern ESG investors also incorporate corporate governance structure into their investment 
strategies (the “G” in ESG.) In addition, these values-based funds now seek to allure investors 
through the superior investment returns, in addition to their ethical benefits, as the funds may 
have less exposure to long-term risks by avoiding certain ESG red flags.34 
The modern term “ESG” was first used in a 2005 research study titled, ‘Who Cares 
Wins,”35 authored by twenty financial institutions from nine countries with total assets under 
managements of over $6 trillion.36 The report argued there was a direct connection between the 
way companies manage their environmental, social, and corporate governance issues and their 
overall management qualities.37 In addition, the report argued that companies with high E, S, and 
G performance increase shareholder value, by “properly managing risks, anticipating regulatory 
action or accessing new markets, while at the same time contributing to the sustainable 
development of the societies in which they operate. Moreover, these issues can have a strong 
impact on reputation and brands, an increasingly important part of company value.”38 The report 
recommended that investment analysts and financial institutions incorporate ESG factors into 
their research and investment processes to help better value companies and contribute towards 
more stable and sustainable financial markets.39 
B. ESG Investing 
 Individuals today have many different opportunities to invest in ESG. Research firms 
evaluate companies for their corporate governance structure and their environmental and social 
impact and give an ESG or green designation to companies meeting certain requirements. 
Additionally, investment companies offer ESG funds that invest in ESG-friendly companies, and 
individuals can buy into these funds just as they can buy into a mutual fund or exchange-traded 
fund (ETF).40 Individuals can either invest directly in ESG-friendly companies or in ESG-
friendly investment vehicles like a mutual fund or an ETF.41 They can invest their discretionary 
dollars in a taxable brokerage account, through brokers such as Fidelity or Robinhood, or they 
can allocate portions of a retirement account, like an IRA, towards those companies or funds. In 
theory, if an employer provided an ESG option, employees could also direct their 401(k) dollars 
into an ESG fund, much as employees can currently direct those funds into a suite of non-ESG 
investment options. 
 
33 Max Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and 
Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 392 (2020). 
34 Id. 
35 UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, WHO CARES WINS (2004), available at 
https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/issues_doc%2FFinancial_markets%2Fwho_cares_who_wins.pdf.  
36 Id. at i.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at ii, v 
40 Jeff Reeves, 7 Socially Responsible ETFs to Buy Now, U.S. NEWS (June 17, 2020), 
https://money.usnews.com/investing/funds/slideshows/socially-responsible-etfs-to-buy-now.  




 ESG funds and ESG managers use different types of portfolio construction tools and 
strategies to build fiscally and socially responsible investment products. Except for passive ESG 
indexes (discussed below), most ESG funds are actively-managed funds that use ESG 
information as a part of their investment strategy. All actively managed funds use a specific 
strategy in their attempt to “beat the index,” or product risk-adjusted returns.42 Some of those 
strategies might include being overweight in growth sectors or looking for a specific amount of 
leverage or debt to capital ratio. Active ESG funds use ESG metrics to attempt to come to a 
deeper understanding of a company’s value and beat a benchmark to produce outsized returns.  
Recent research by JP Morgan Chase concluded there is a significant value-add to considering 
ESG factors as part of active portfolio management and demonstrates “that the boost in alpha 
[returns] arises from ESG’s risk mitigant nature…[and] carr[ies] significantly lower credit risk 
relative to the ‘Pure Value’ [non ESG] strategy.”43 
A group of financial industry leaders working with the Investment Company Institute 
classified three different methods of ESG investing.44 The first method of ESG investing is “ESG 
exclusionary,” which is the most similar to the passive screening tactics used in the past.45 These 
types of funds simply eliminate companies based on a specific value. For example, Nuveen’s 
ESG Mid-Cap Growth ETF is a broad asset allocation fund that screens out fossil fuel 
companies, while still maintaining traditional broad market exposure.46 Another example of an 
ESG friendly ETF that maintains broad exposure while screening out fossil fuels is State Street's 
SPDR S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Free ETF, which mimics the S&P 500 but screens out fossil fuel 
companies.47  Similar ESG funds and indexes exist where the manager just screens out tobacco 
companies.48  
Funds using ESG exclusionary strategies can be active or passive funds—fund managers 
can choose either to simply mimic an existing index, but exclude certain companies for “bad” 
ESG practices,49 or funds can be actively managed using a proprietary investment strategies, yet 
refuse to include certain companies with “bad” ESG practices. 
The second and third type of ESG investing, called “ESG inclusionary” and “impact 
investing,” both take an active investment approach.50 Morningstar, a highly regarded 
independent investment research company, described this active approach to ESG investing as 
 
 
42 Active Management, CORPORATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTE, 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/active-management/.  
43 SHIVAM GHOSH, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., VIRTUE ISN’T THE ONLY REWARD 1 (15 March 2020). On file with 
the author, Courtesy J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Copyright 2021. 
44 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, FUNDS USE OF ESG INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABLE INVESTING STRATEGIES: 
AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2020), https://www.ici.org/pdf/20_ppr_esg_integration.pdf. 
45 Id. at 5 
46 Lara Crigger, Dirtiest & Cleanest ESG Funds, ETF.COM (June 30, 2020), https://www.etf.com/sections/features-
and-news/dirtiest-cleanest-esg-funds?nopaging=1 
47 Max Chen, Investors are Re-Evaluating the Future of Fossil Fuel, Energy, ETF TRENDS: ESG CHANNEL (Dec. 11, 
2020), https://www.etftrends.com/esg-channel/investors-are-re-evaluating-the-future-of-fossil-fuel-energy/.  
48 Joe McGrath, MSCI Launches Tobacco Exclusion Indexes, ESG CLARITY (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://esgclarity.com/msci-launches-tobacco-exclusion-indexes/.  
49 Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1935-1938. 
50  INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, FUNDS USE OF ESG INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABLE INVESTING STRATEGIES: 
AN INTRODUCTION 6-7 (2020), https://www.ici.org/pdf/20_ppr_esg_integration.pdf. 
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 a risk-management process, as companies that embrace sustainable practices are 
managing liabilities better than others, perhaps recognizing new opportunities, and may 
be better positioned to grow in the future. Environmental, social, and governance 
investing has evolved from funds that simply screened out undesirable companies like 
polluters or sellers of tobacco to strategies that apply a matrix of sophisticated screens to 
assess the best and worst players in every industry and actively seek to have a positive 
impact in many ways.51 
 
Both ESG inclusionary and impact investing strategies use ESG information to select 
which companies to include in a portfolio. A portfolio using an ESG inclusionary strategy might 
diversify its holding across sectors and choose to include companies with higher relative ESG 
scores as compared to peer companies in that same industry. A fund using the impact investing 
strategy would have its investment analysts pick high quality companies with high ESG scores in 
a specific value of interest, to build a “green” fund or a “gender diversity” fund. Both of these 
strategies use active investing rather than passive screening, as analysts are actively reviewing 
and investigating a company’s overall structure and value, and include high quality companies 
that also score well on the specific desired ESG metric. This is different from a passive screening 
strategy, where a fund will simply mimic another fund or index, but screen out “bad” ESG 
companies. 
One example of an ESG investment advisor that uses active asset management research 
to pick companies that are predicted to perform well overall and have a positive ESG global 
impact is the newly launched Humankind Investments. This investment advisor has an actively 
managed ESG ETF that, like many of the other actively managed ESG funds, uses the same sort 
of valuation tactics as other non-ESG funds, but simply weighs the ESG classifications higher 
than a non ESG fund might otherwise.  
Humankind’s analysts use a variety of factors, including ESG and traditional financial 
metrics, to calculate a Humankind Value score, and invests in companies with high scores on this 
metric. The founder, James Katz, explained the logic behind the process as reflective of his belief 
“that traditional investment analysis, with its typically narrow focus on standalone financial 
performance, fails to fully capture a company’s ability to remain sustainable and competitive in 
the long run.”52 Humankind acknowledges they are not looking only to invest in companies that 
are perfect on all possible ESG factors and that they are just looking to include companies that 
add more positive impact on the world than negative.53 This approach of looking at the overall 
ESG picture and the company's overall ESG global impact is a strategy that is common across 
active ESG investors.  
 
51 Russel Kinnel, How Vanguard, Fidelity, and Others Embrace ESG Investing, MORNINGSTAR (Jun. 2, 2020), 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/986785/how-vanguard-fidelity-and-others-embrace-esg-investing.  
52 Baley McCann, Former Vanguard Analyst James Katz Launched Humankind Investments in 2019, and its ESG 
Etf Will Track a Proprietary ‘Equity Index’, CITY WIRE (Feb. 24, 2021), https://citywireusa.com/professional-
buyer/news/former-vanguard-analysts-firm-launches-its-first-esg-etf/a1471387.  
53 Positive Impact Doesn’t Require Perfection, HUMANKIND INVESTMENTS,  
https://www.humankind.co/article?__hstc=246760475.03ac9d2db8fdaac5096f8982b29c438b.1614198786313.1614
198786313.1614198786313.1&__hssc=246760475.1.1614198786314&__hsfp=1895085607#3Cf2oVL59Ag0CbVT
qHe7wx, last accessed April 16, 2021.  
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C. ESG Performance 
A persistent, but untrue, stereotype about ESG investing that has likely contributed to the 
Labor Department’s strict regulation on ESG investing, is that ESG investments have poor 
returns compared to non-ESG investments.54 This claim may come from outdated understandings 
of what ESG investing looks like (pure screening mechanism versus an active process as detailed 
above) or from a political agenda seeking to discourage investment in sustainable or green 
businesses. No matter its generation or motivation, broad brushing ESG investing as 
irresponsible investing is simply untrue. 
 Scores of studies and years of research have shown no increased risk in investing in ESG 
versus traditional non-ESG funds, and, in fact, some recent studies and interviews with 
investment analysts have suggested there is less risk in investing in ESG versus non ESG funds. 
A 2020 Morningstar study showed there was no greater investment risk to investing in ESG, 
rather than non-ESG, on a global level.55  A 2019 study found that a high ESG portfolio 
outperformed a comparable low ESG portfolio by 16 basis points per year.56 A 2015 study 
examined over 2,000 studies of ESG performance and found that, in 90% of the studies, there 
was no negative relationship between concern for social factors and corporate financial 
performance.57 And, a large majority of the studies found a stable and positive relationship 
between ESG factors and corporate financial performance.58 This positive correlation between 
ESG scores and financial performance makes sense—the factors underlying high ESG ratings 
also help to drive value, by lowering risks of worker safety incidents, pollution spills, litigation, 
and other public relations disasters that can damage a company’s brand and valuation.59 
 
54 Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLORADO L. REV. 
731, n. 7 (“See, e.g., Jon Hale, Does Sustainable Investing Help or Hurt Returns?, MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 7, 2017), 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=839607 [https://perma.cc/F5JL-RRMH] (describing the 
continuing “misimpression” that sustainable investing will hurt returns). A 2015 study found that “misperceptions of 
negative impact of investment performance” was considered a major challenge by 60 percent of respondents and a 
moderate challenge by 28 percent. ROBERT G. ECCLES & MIRTHA D. KASTRAPELI, THE INVESTING 
ENLIGHTENMENT: HOW PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM CAN CREATE SUSTAINABLE VALUE 
THROUGH ESG (2017) (quoting UNPRI & CERULLI ASSOCIATES, Evolving Product Trends: Strategic Beta 
and ESG/SRI, U.S. PROD. & STRATEGIES 2016, 80 (2016)), 
http://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/statestreet/documents/Articles/The_Investing_Enlightenment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GB53-ZM8H].  
55 Madison Sargis & Patrick Wang, How Does Investing in ESG Companies Affect Returns, MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 19, 
2020), https://www.morningstar.com/insights/2020/02/19/esg-companies.  
56 Guatum Dhingra & Christopher J. Olson, ESG Investing: Can You Have Your Cake and Eat it Too? CFA 
Institute, (Sept. 3, 2019),  https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/09/03/esg-investing-can-you-have-your-cake-
and-eat-it-too/.  
57 Gunnar Friede et al, ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical 
Studies, 5. J. Sustainable Finance & Investment 210, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20430795.2015.1118917.  
58 Id.  
59 SARA BERNOW ET AL, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, FROM ‘WHY’ TO ‘WHY NOT’: SUSTAINABLE INVESTING AS THE 






 Incorporating ESG analysis is now considered by the financial industry to be an 
important part of responsible portfolio construction.60 A recent research report from J.P. Morgan 
Chase tested this theory, tracking the performance of funds constrained to only the “top rated 
ESG issuers,” and found this type of ESG constraint “not only improves the ESG profile of a 
portfolio but also boosts alpha [return].”61 The report concluded that “for an active manager 
following a Value-like strategy, ESG constraints can increase returns and improve risk adjusted 
performance.”62  
Unsurprisingly, many actively managed ESG funds outperform other types of actively 
managed funds. This outperformance makes sense when you understand the value-add of ESG 
factor analysis to an analyst’s understanding of a company’s ESG-related risk exposure. For 
example, Vanguard’s FTSE Social Index Fund saw outsized returns over one year (18.3%,) three 
years (10%,) and five years (14.4%.)63 This performance beat out 98% of non-ESG funds 
holding stock in large companies with similar growth and value characteristics.64  
The anti-ESG advocates arguing that it is fiscally irresponsible to invest retirement plan 
assets in ESG funds are out-of-step with what the financial industry has determined is the best 
step for increased returns. 
 As mentioned above, one reason why this negative, yet untrue, perception of ESG 
investing continues to circulate even in highly educated circles is because of an outdated 
understanding of what ESG investing entails. Critics point to some ESG investors’ tendencies to 
screen out companies based on non-ESG friendly factors, such as companies that issue dual-class 
shares (a “no no” for ESG investors particularly concerned about governance issues.)  Bernard S. 
Sharfman recently made the claim in the Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin that ESG investing 
is irresponsible because it screens out companies with bad “G” ratings, like Alphabet or Zoom, 
making the fund inherently underperform the broader market. 65  The argument is that, if ESG 
funds are excluding companies with dual-class shares, they are inherently screening out some of 
the most successful and high performing equities from companies like Alphabet, Zoom, and 
Facebook, all of which issue multiple classes of shares.  
This way of describing ESG investing is misleading for many reasons, mostly because it 
mis-characterizes what ESG investing actually is. As discussed above, much of ESG investing 
today does not use the automatic ESG exclusionary strategy criticized by some anti-ESG 
advocates. So, the criticism that ESG investing is inherently irresponsible because it screens out 
high performers doesn’t even apply to a huge swath of the ESG market.  
 And, in many cases, using the ESG exclusionary strategy criticized by Sharfman and 
others actually produces the opposite of what critics claim it does. In many instances, excluding 
companies with “bad” ESG metrics can cause outperformance, as described above, rather than 
underperformance, exactly because the screened-out characteristics make those “bad” companies 
higher risk or poor investments.  For example, many fossil-fuel exclusionary ESG funds have 
 
60 SHIVAM GHOSH, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., VIRTUE ISN’T THE ONLY REWARD 1 (15 March 2020). On file with 
the author, Courtesy J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Copyright 2021. 
61 Id. at 2.  
62 Id. at 1. 




65 Bernard S. Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38 YALE J. ON REGULATION BULLETIN 112,121-122 (2020). 
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outperformed other non ESG indexes because they screen out these high-risk fossil fuel 
companies that have underperformed in the past years.66 
Evidence suggests that ESG funds, whether actively managed or exclusionary, 
specifically outperform in economic downturns,67 as they are better insulated against downside 
risks. This type of outperformance makes sense because ESG factors align with many of the risks 
that may hurt a company during a downturn.68 But whether ESG funds only outperform in a 
down market, outperform in all markets, or simply provide similar returns to non-ESG 
investments,69 it's illogical to treat these types of investments any differently than other kinds of 
investments, given their similar, or in certain cases more favorable, returns to investors.  
D. Demand for ESG 
ESG investing has become extremely popular, both among individual and institutional 
investors. ESG’s popularity is due to two factors. The first, of course, is the nature of ESG as 
valued-based. ESG’s global value proposition speaks to all values-based investors, and 
specifically to millennials, who are overrepresented in the recent growth in demand for ESG 
investment products. Between 2015 and 2019, interest in sustainable investing jumped from 71% 
to 85% in the general population of investors, but from 84% to 95% in millennial investors.70  A 
2019 Ernst & Young report found that “demand for sustainable investments is being driven, in 
part, by millennials who prefer to investment in alignment with personal values.”71 
 
66  Now You Can Compare Fossil Free Funds to Index Funds, Fossil Free Funds (May 20, 2020), 
https://fossilfreefunds.org/blog/2020/05/20/now-you-can-compare-fossil-free-funds-to-index-funds.html (“Over the 
past 12 months, again the basic S&P 500 fund is lowest (+0.83), the Parnassus fund is next (+1.58), and the “fossil 
fuel reserves free” is outperforming (+1.99).”); Jeff Benjamin, As Pandemic Rages On, ESG Funds Shine Brightly, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (April 19, 2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/as-pandemic-rages-on-esg-funds-shine-
brightly-191673 (“Part of the strength of ESG strategies in the current downturn can be attributed to the fact that 
most ESG funds have limited exposure to the fossil fuel industries, which have suffered so far this year.”) 
67 Id. 
68 Tom Lauricella, Jess Liu, Sustainable Funds Weather Downturns Better Than Peers, MORNINGSTAR (Jun. 15, 
2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/988114/sustainable-funds-weather-downturns-better-than-peers 
(“...evidence continues to build that ESG funds provide less downside risk than do their traditional peers. Investing 
in sustainable strategies has the potential to offer investors beneficial portfolio risk attributes and downside 
cushioning over short- and long-term time horizons. Add in the long-run benefits of investing in companies better 
poised to navigate risks poised by climate change or highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ESG story is 
becoming more compelling.”) 
69 Russel Kinnel, How Vanguard, Fidelity, and Others Embrace ESG Investing, MORNINGSTAR (Jun 2, 2020), 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/986785/how-vanguard-fidelity-and-others-embrace-esg-investing (“Will ESG 
Investing Improve My Performance? The answer is to be determined. When I’ve looked at the data, it always shows 
that ESG funds collectively have average performance. Or, to put it another way, an ESG focus doesn’t help as 
much as its biggest cheerleaders say, nor does it hurt as much as its critics say. To me, that makes sense. A 
sustainable focus ought to be a positive, but on the other hand, many low-ESG companies like tobacco or oil trade at 
very low valuations because of those liabilities. Perhaps that cheapness will be sufficient to compensate investors for 
taking on those risks. However, as I mentioned, ESG has evolved significantly in approach and in terms of the firms 
managing those strategies. So, even if the past data showed a more meaningful performance pattern, I’d be wary of 
projecting that into the future.”) 







The second factor leading to the increase in demand for ESG products, especially more 
recently, is the continued high performance of ESG funds, due to their inclusion of additional 
risk factors into the traditional financial analysis. Individual investors and analysts and managers 
at institutional investment shops are citing performance as their main driver of ESG investing.72 
ESG investing truly is both good for the planet and for our portfolios. 
 Individual investors, who are among the millennial population and the general investor 
population, are increasingly turning to sustainable investing as a way to align their investment 
decisions with their values, while making good returns in the process. A 2017 study from 
Nuveen showed that 4 out of 5 investors “want their investments to make a positive impact on 
society and on environmental sustainability.”73 
 These individual investors are not naive, nor are they subjugating returns to their values. 
A recent study on individual investors reported that a majority of investors cited performance as 
their main motivation for investing in these types of responsible investments.74 53% cited “better 
performance” and 46% cited “aligns with my values.”75 ESG investments offer investors a rare 
opportunity to marry their values with increased financial returns. Institutional investors are also 
recognizing the financial benefits of investing in ESG, and many even incorporate ESG analysis 
into their non-ESG funds.76  
Despite all of this institutional and individual investor interest in ESG investments, 
401(k) plans are woefully behind when it comes to offering ESG options for their retirement 
investors. While one-third of all professional managed assets are invested in funds using ESG 
strategies (a total of $17 trillion),77 and $1.7 trillion are invested directly in ESG funds,78 these 
are almost exclusively held in non-ERISA regulated [definitionally non-401(k) accounts].79 Just 
3% of employers offer an ESG option in their 401(k) lineup and only 0.1% of overall 401(k) 
assets (less than $9 billion) are currently invested in an ESG fund.  
But this discrepancy between the percent of retirement assets invested in ESG and the 
percent of overall assets in ESG is not due to lack of investor interest—it is due to the high 
regulatory burden placed on fiduciaries of retirement plan funds. This article posits that, if that 
barrier were lowered, retirement plan assets would shift towards sustainable investments, 
increasing the overall total of assets invested in sustainable business.  
This change would be good for the planet, since it rewards ESG-friendly options and 
incentivizes other companies to follow suit, and is good for retirement plan participants, since 
 
72 SHIVAM GHOSH, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., VIRTUE ISN’T THE ONLY REWARD 1 (15 March 2020). On file with 
the author, Courtesy J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Copyright 2021. 
73 Jon Hale, 3 Myths About Sustainable Funds, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/946453/3-myths-about-sustainable-funds.  
74 Performance Tops Investors Motives for Responsible Investing, Nuveen (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.nuveen.com/en-us/insights/responsible-investing/fifth-annual-responsible-investing-survey.  
75 Id. 
76 Leslie P. Norton, 401(k) Plan Managers Will Promote ESG Funds Despite Pushback, BARRONS (Oct. 1, 2020), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/401-k-plan-managers-will-promote-esg-funds-despite-pushback-51601580478.  
77 PARNASSUS INVESTMENTS, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 1 (2020) 
https://www.ussif.org/files/Trends%20Report%202020%20Executive%20Summary.pdf. 
78 Simon Jessup & Elizabeth Howcroft, Sustainable Fund Assets Hit Record 41.7 Trillion in 2020: Morningstar, 
Reuters (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-funds-sustainable/sustainable-fund-assets-hit-
record-1-7-trln-in-2020-morningstar-idUSKBN29X2NM.  




they can direct their assets towards funds they believe in, and trust they will have as good, if not 
better, returns down the line. 
 
II. THE RETIREMENT CRISIS, AND WHAT ESG CAN DO ABOUT IT 
 The extent of the retirement crisis facing Americans is well-documented and well-
known.80  The typical (median) American worker has $0 saved for retirement.81 40% of 
Americans have a retirement savings account, but the median amount saved is only $40,000, 
while the recommended savings target is six times current income at age 50.82 Americans are 
well-aware of their own retirement insecurity -- 65% are convinced they will have to work past 
the normal retirement age in order to afford to retire83 and 51% predict tthey will be unable to 
maintain their current standard of living in retirement.84 
 Congress has attempted to address this retirement crisis over the past two decades. with 
major retirement-specific legislation, like the Pension Protection Act85 and the SECURE Act.86 
Congress has also tried incremental changes to encourage more retirement savings, such as 
creating new forms of retirement accounts such as Roth IRAs or creating other tax-advantaged 
savings vehicles like health savings accounts.87 But the retirement crisis still persists.  
More action is needed to encourage more people to save for retirement. Allowing 
employees to invest their retirement dollars in value-based investment vehicles may encourage 
additional retirement savings, especially for younger workers, as it would allow them to align 
their retirement savings with their personal values. This could be achieved by a simple regulatory 
change at the agency level and would not require the expensive and protracted wrangling and 
politicking that comes with large-scale Congressional action. 
 
80 David A. Pratt, Too Big to Fail? The U.S. Retirement System in 2019, 27 ELDER L. J. 327, 328 (2020); David 
English, Covid-19 and its Impact on America’s Retirement System, 46 ACTEC L. J. 35, 35 (2020); Regina T. 
Jefferson, “Let Them Eat Cake”: Examining United States Retirement Savings Policy Through the Lens of 
International Human Rights Principles, 31 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 64-66 (2018); Chris Farrell, Analysis: The 
Pandemic is Making America’s Retirement Crisis Worse. Here’s What You Can Do, PBS (April 30, 2020), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/analysis-the-pandemic-is-making-americas-retirement-crisis-worse-heres-
what-you-can-do; Teresa Ghilarducci & Tony James, America’s Retirement Savings Crisis is Now. Here’s How to 
Fix It, CNN (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/15/perspectives/retirement-savings-crisis/index.html.  
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85 Julia Kagan, Pension Protection Act of 2006, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 27, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pensionprotectionact2006.asp#:~:text=The%20Pension%20Protection%20A
ct%20sought,their%20401(k)%20plan.  
86 Daniel Kurt, What Is the SECURE Act and How Could it Affect Your Retirement, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 19, 2021), 
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A. Millennial Retirement Insecurity 
Retirement insecurity is especially heightened among millennials. 77% of millennials 
fear they'll either never retire or will have to work far past the normal retirement age, as 
compared to 36% of Gen Xers and 29% of baby boomers.88 A research study by Aon Hewitt 
determined that millennials are at the highest risk of retirement insecurity compared to older 
generations, and predicted that eight out of ten millennials will not be able to meet their financial 
needs in retirement without significant changes in their saving and investing behaviors.89  
Ninety-five percent of working millennials have insufficient retirement savings.90 Two-
thirds of working millennials, or 54.9 million young Americans, have no retirement savings at 
all.91 Among those millennials who are saving for retirement, most are still vastly under saving. 
The median account balance in millennial retirement accounts is $19,100.92 Some financial 
professionals suggest this generation should save between $1.8 to $2.2. million for retirement, or 
between 15-22% of their annual income.93 Yet currently, the 85% millennials who have 
retirement savings are saving less than 6%, with an average employee retirement savings rate of 
5%.94 This lack of savings is especially shocking given that 60% of surveyed millennial investors 
agreed with the statement ““I expect Social Security to go bankrupt before I retire” (as compared 
to 47% of overall workers.)95 
One of the main reasons millennials are woefully underprepared for their financial needs 
in retirement is because of the outsized impact the shift from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution plans has had on this generation. Defined-benefit plans have all but disappeared, 
especially for millennial workers, and employers have recplaed this retirement benefit with 
401(k) type plans.96 401(k) plans may be better from an employer-persepctive, but from an 
employee persepctive, they make retirement security much less secure. While many employers 
offer an employer match where they contribute towards the employee’s 401(k) type plan, this 
match is nothing like the defined benefit pension plans of the past.  
In a defined benefit plan, the employer bears most of the market risk and has the burden 
of ensuring that the pension is adequately funded and manages to provide adequate retirement 
income for the employees. In a 401(k)-type plan, the employee bears that risk. Unlike with a 
traditional defined benefit pension plan, workers with 401(k) type plans do not have any 
 
88 Tom Conway, Why Retirement Insecurity is the New American Epidemic, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS (Mar. 3, 2020), 
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91 Id. at 1.  
92 Id. at 14 
93 Id. at 15 
94 Id. 
95 Generational Retirement Trends Study, T. ROWE PRICE (2015), at slide 15, available at 
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guaranteed retirement savings—they bear the responsibility and risk of participating in the plan, 
contributing to the plan, and managing the plan. 
The shift from employer-sponsored defined benefit plans (traditional pensions) to 
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans (401(k) like plans)97 shifts the burden of who is 
responsible for ensuring the employee’s retirement security. Traditional defined benefit pension 
plans are maintained by employers and contributed to by employers. Employees are not able to 
touch the retirement savings accruing in the pension plan until a specified retirement date. In a 
traditional defined benefit pension plan, employers hold the risk and liability for maintaining 
income for their employees in retirement. These plans guarantee employees a steady stream of 
income throughout retirement, typically determined based on average wages earned at a 
specified time prior to retirement. Traditional defined benefit pension plans are structured so that 
retirement benefits typically come close to replacing pre-retirement wages.98 
 401(k) type plans, on the other hand, place the burden of savings and investing those 
savings on the employee. The most common type of investment option in a 401(k) plan is a 
mutual fund or similar type of fund that pools participants’ assets and is managed by a 
professional fund manager. The menu of investment options for employees is created by the 
employer, often with the help of plan service providers. There is usually a range of options (with 
an average of 14)99 and employees can choose which option or options they would like to invest 
part or all of their retirement plan assets in. Requiring employees to manage their retirement 
savings is less desirable than the professionally managed defined benefit plan structure for many 
reasons, including that Americans are on average financially illiterate and lack basic knowledge 
required to make investment decisions.100 
While the shift from traditional defined benefit pension plan to 401(k) type plans was 
detrimental to all employees, it has had a disproportionately detrimental impact on the newest 
generation of workers. These Millennial workers have found themselves on the losing end of 
two-tiered wage and benefit agreements, where companies continue pension benefits for older 
workers, while phasing them out for younger workers. Millennials almost exclusively have 
defined contribution plans instead of defined benefit plans.101 
 Millennial workers are also disproportionately affected by the self-directed nature of a 
401(k) plan versus the employer managed nature of a traditional defined benefit pension plan. 
Millennials have the lowest rates of participation in 401(k) type plans compared to older 
generations of workers. Studies from both 2011 and 2018 showed that only half of millennials 
 
97 401(k) plans are the most common and well-known type of defined contribution plan, so this paper will use 
401(k) to be synonymous with defined-contribution plans. 
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100 Deepa Das Acevedo, Addressing the Retirement Crisis with Shadow 401(k)s, 92 NOTRE DAME L. R. online 38, 
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eligible to participate in a defined contribution plan did so.102 And even those millennials who 
are participating in their 401(k) type plans are not saving enough.  
B. ESG As a Marginal Savings Nudge 
 Employers seeking to increase participation in and contribution to an employer-
sponsored, participant directed retirement savings plan should consider offering an ESG option 
in their investment lineup as a way to nudge more employees to save more dollars in these types 
of accounts. This could be particularly impactful for millennial workers, who are particularly 
interested in values-based investing.  
Studies have shown that millennials consider companies’ global impact before buying 
their product or investing in their business, and that millennials seek to tailor their investments to 
their values.103 The financial industry recognizes the importance of ESG considerations to 
millennials, and uses ESG as a strategy to attract millennial investors.104 Employers should do 
the same and entice more millennial employees to participate in and save more in their 
retirement plans by offering millennial-friendly ESG investment options.  
To be clear, this is not a band aid that can solve all millennial economic woes. Offering 
an ESG option in the investment plan lineup will likely not encourage millennials who simply 
have no funds to invest to start investing in their 401(k). Millennials face record levels of student 
debt,105 and, in some cases, it makes financial sense to use income to pay down student debt 
before saving for retirement.106 Millennials may also be saving for a down payment, or using 
their income on childcare, the costs of which have both increased at a record pace. For millennial 
workers who simply have no discretionary dollars to invest after paying or saving for basic 
necessities and financing existing debt, opting out of a 401(k) may be the most financially savvy 
decision. But that is not all millennials.  
Many millennial workers do have discretionary dollars left after they meet their basic 
needs each month, and it is these millennials who may save more if offered an ESG option. Only 
39% of millennial workers who are eligible but do not participate in their 401(k) plans stated 
they have trouble meeting monthly expenses. Many millennials who opt out or under utilize their 
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401(k)s are simply saving elsewhere, likely in retail investment apps popular among millennials, 
like Robinhood.107 For example, 8% of millennials eligible for 401(k)s but not participating in 
the 401(k) stated they don’t participate because they are saving through other vehicles.108 
Additionally, 15% of millennials who are saving less than the maximum amount in their 401(k) 
stated they are under-saving in their 401(k) because they are using other investment vehicles.109 
These investment-savvy but non- or under- 401(k) participating millennials are the ones who 
could be enticed to save more for retirement if the 401(k) investment lineup spoke more to their 
investment values.  
Millennial behavior on individual investment platforms such as Robinhood underscore 
this interest and also the fact that Millenials will indeed invest if the opportunity is a good match 
for their values. Robinhood’s investor base is overwhelmingly millennial, with the average 
investor age of 31. And what these millennial investors are chasing through Robinhood is the 
trend of investing in clean energy.110  But the disadvantage to using a Robinhood account to 
invest in sustainable companies is that in Robinhood investments are less tax-advantaged than 
401(k) investments, and there is no potential employer match for Robinhood “contributions.”111  
If an employer offered a sustainable, environmentally friendly ESG fund within the tax-
advantaged employer-sponsored retirement plan, especially if the company were matching 
employee contributions, it seems likely to redirect millennial savings away from tax-inefficient 
platforms like Robinhood and towards tax-efficient savings vehicles like 401(k)s. Not only 
would this provision of an ESG fund offer better returns and less investment risk for retirement 
plan assets,112 but it would encourage greater millennial participation in and contribution to the 
plan in the first place.  
Allowing employees to invest their 401(k) funds in a well-selected ESG investment 
option is not the be-all-end-all solution to millennial retirement woes. But it could encourage 
millennial workers, at the margin, to increase their retirement savings, at very little or no cost. 
And with the enormous impact that compound interest has on the value of dollars invested early 
in one’s career, that marginal early investments could have an outsized impact on millennial 
retirement security. 
III.  ERISA REGULATION OF ESG INVESTING 
There is clear and overwhelming individual and institutional interest for ESG investing, 
and including ESG funds in 401(k) lineups could have a marginal, yet significant, impact on 
increased economic security for millennials in retirement. The current regulatory framework for 
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ESG investments, however, makes it difficult for Americans to invest their employer-sponsored 
retirement accounts in ESG funds.  
Limiting ESG access for retirement plan assets not only keeps the trillions of dollars in 
401(k) assets out of the sustainable market,113 but it also limits the extent to which many 
Americans can even access ESG. More than 20 percent of American households’ only form of 
investment ownership is an employer-sponsored retirement account.114 Lowering the regulatory 
barriers to investing retirement funds in ESG will increase access to and investment in ESGs and 
could simultaneously encourage increased retirement savings.  
Before delving into the history of ERISA and its subsequent regulations curtailing the 
inclusion of ESG options in ERISA-regulated investment plan lineups, I describe the regulatory 
framework, as it stands under the current rule, Financial Factors for Selecting Plan Investments 
(the “ESG Rule”.) Although the Department of Labor announced in March 2021 that it would 
not be enforcing this rule, this is still the current rule that individual litigants can sue under if 
they believe they suffered losses to their plan because of the fiduciaries’ decision to include an 
ESG option.  
Furthermore, even if the Financial Factors rule is likely to be replaced by a more pro- 
ESG Rule in the next few years under the 2021 Department of Labor, the Financial Factors rule 
still sets the standard for how a retirement plan provider must act if they wish to include an ESG 
option today. 
A. Trump’s anti-ESG Rule 
 While the ESG Rule was not issued in its final form nor published until late 2020, the 
Trump Labor Department made it clear early that they would be taking a critical eye to ESG 
investing of retirement plan assets. A Field-Assistance Bulletin issued in 2018 warned that 
“fiduciaries must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant to the particular 
investment.”115 The Department reiterated this lukewarm stance on ESG when issuing the ESG 
rule in 2020, warning that “private employer-sponsored retirement plans are not for furthering 
social goals or policy objectives but rather to provide for retirement security of workers.”116 The 
final rule did not explicitly ban ESG investments in retirement plan lineups. Instead, it laid out a 
complex process that fiduciaries needed to follow to ensure they did not violate their fiduciary 
duties by offering an ESG fund.117 
 The rule colloquially known as “the ESG Rule” doesn’t even use the term ESG in the text 
of the rule (although it is all over the preamble.) Instead, the Labor Department’s rule regulates 
the use of ESG funds by ERISA regulated fiduciaries through an opaque word—“pecuniary.” 
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The rule lays out the types of factors that are permissible for fiduciaries to consider when 
choosing plan investments, namely “pecuniary” factors, and those that are impossible for 
fiduciaries to consider, namely “non-pecuniary” factors. The rule defines “pecuniary” as “a 
factor that a fiduciary prudently determined is expected to have a material effect on the risk 
and/or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the 
plan’s investment objectives.”118   
The regulation sets forth two exceptions to the pecuniary factors requirement. First, a 
fiduciary can choose plans that “promote, seek, or support non-pecuniary goals” as long as the 
investment choice can be justified solely on the basis of pecuniary factors.119 The second 
exception is that a fiduciary can choose a plan based on non-pecuniary factors, as long as they 
can pass the “tie breaker test.”120  
 In the first exception, a fiduciary who wants to include a plan that considered non-
pecuniary (maybe ESG) factors can do so, as long as the fiduciary justifies the inclusion of this 
plan based solely on pecuniary (materially relevant economic) factors.  
Of course, an employer who wanted to include an ESG option in their lineup could do 
this. The premise of this entire paper is that many ESG funds do rely on ESG as a clearly 
pecuniary, or economically relevant factor. But the fact that the rule requires fiduciaries to 
document this pecuniary benefit upfront,121 rather than simply presuming that ESG 
considerations are pecuniary, and therefore economically relevant to the investment, is the crux 
of the problem with this regulation. It presumes that ESG factors are not pecuniary, or 
economically relevant, and therefore requires the fiduciaries to carry the burden of proving that 
they are, up front, before any beneficiary even complains about potential losses down the line. 
 In the case where a fiduciary either concedes that ESG factors are not pecuniary or does 
not want to go through the steps of proving they are pecuniary, the rule sets out another avenue a 
fiduciary can take to include an ESG investment in the lineup. The rule allows fiduciaries to use 
an exception known as the “tie breaker” exception, which traditionally was used when there was 
a tie between two exact investment options, so you can use non-pecuniary factors to “break the 
tie.”122 Here, fiduciaries are allowed to consider non-pecuniary factors, such as some ESG 
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factors but only if the fiduciary again follows a lengthy documentation process upfront, 
justifying the consideration of these socially desirable but non-pecuniary factors.123  
Requiring that documentation process upfront raises the same issue and question as the 
first exception—why are fiduciaries required to document the necessity or inherent value-add of 
looking to ESG factors when considering the value of an investment option? Why is there a 
higher burden upfront on funds using an ESG investing strategy versus any other type of 
proprietary active management strategy? 
 To reiterate, the Trump ESG Rule does not ban ESG options in retirement plans. The rule 
explicitly states in the preamble, “nothing in the final rule precludes a fiduciary from looking 
into certain types of investment alternatives in light of participant demand for those types of 
investments….”124 It does, however, caution fiduciaries against ESG funds, warning fiduciaries 
that they should not “too hastily conclud[e] that ESG funds may be selected based on pecuniary 
factors or [under the “tie-breaker” rule] are not distinguishable based on pecuniary factors.”125 
This regulation sets up walls of red tape, increasing the cost, burden, and litigation risk of 
offering an ESG option. 
The Department of Labor’s lukewarm stance on ESG investing of ERISA-regulated plan 
assets is one of the main reasons for, if not the main reason for, the lack of access to ESG 
investing in retirement plan lineups. As of 2019, 3% of 401(k) plans offer an ESG fund in their 
investment lineup.126 The reason why that percentage is so low is because of the enormous 
burden fiduciaries face when seeking to include those funds in their plans, and the inherent risk 
of litigation to plans that offer them. The rule raises compliance costs and raises litigation risk 
for employers seeking to provide ESG options in their lineup, and it is understandable, given the 
enormous cost of ERISA litigation, why most employers chose to avoid the risk altogether.  
 As a result of the Trump ESG Rule’s requirement that fiduciaries either justify ESG 
factors as pecuniary upfront, or go through the steps of the tie breaker, there are high compliance 
costs, and as a result, few employers offer ESG options in their lineups. Employers and their 
fiduciaries may feel the need to hire third party investment managers or plan consultants127 to 
help them navigate the process of justifying including an ESG option, or to shield or offset 
liability in a potential ERISA suit down the line.128 Other companies who cannot afford to hire 
these types of third-party advisors may simply choose not to include an ESG option.  
This high burden and large compliance costs explain the massive discrepancy between 
non-retirement assets invested in funds using ESG investment strategies (1/3 of all professional 
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managed assets)129 versus retirement assets invested in ESG (less than 0.1% of 401(k) assets.)130 
It is not that employees don’t want to invest in ESG, it’s that employees do not have access to 
ESG. 
This scarcity may be dissuading certain employees from participating in and contributing 
to their retirement plans. This negative impact on retirement savings behavior goes directly 
against the purpose of ERISA and the intent behind its strict regulation of plan fiduciaries.  
To better understand why the 2021 Department of Labor not only can allow ESG options 
in retirement plans, but should encourage the inclusion of these options, this article will next 
discuss the context and goals of ERISA. A more fulsome understanding of the history of ERISA 
and the intention and operation of its strict fiduciary duties will help the reader understand why 
including ESG options in retirement plan lineups is directly in line with ERISA’s intended goal 
of ensuring retirement security for American workers.  
B. Background to ERISA 
Most employer-sponsored retirement plans are regulated under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The provisions of ERISA that regulate retirement plans 
are administered by the U.S. Department of Labor.131 ERISA was passed as the culmination of 
decades of legislative and activist efforts to address the retirement savings crisis in the United 
States and a long history of mismanagement of pension funds.132  
One of the key turning points in the pension crisis that led to ERISA’s adoption into law 
was the very public meltdown of the Studebaker automobile plant, which closed in 1963.133 At 
the time the plant closed, it had over 10,000 employees enrolled in their pension plan.134 Four 
thousand of those ended up receiving only 15 cents on each dollar they were owed, and 2,900 
received nothing.135 In the years following that plant closure and few more disastrous pension 
plan failures, NBC recorded and aired interviews of individuals who had lost their retirement 
savings and economic security due to mismanagement of their pension plans.136 This exposure 
led to a public outcry, and the passing of ERISA.137 
When ERISA was first passed, its goal was simple—to ensure employees’ economic 
security in retirement.138 ERISA attempts to strike a balance between sufficient regulation to 
ensure retirement plan assets are secure, and not too much regulation that would dissuade 
employers from providing retirement plans to begin with.  As such, ERISA does not mandate 
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that all companies must provide specific benefit plans, such as retirement plans. But ERISA does 
mandate that if an employer provides certain types of benefit plans, the plans must comply with 
ERISA standards.139  
The employers who sponsor these plans, and any fiduciary providing investment services 
or management of these plans, are held to ERISA’s strict fiduciary duties to serve the interest of 
plan participants. Plan participants can sue employer sponsors or fiduciaries for breach of 
fiduciary duty. The penalties for breach of fiduciary duty can be astronomical, and ERISA allows 
for fiduciaries to be held personally liable—so fiduciaries can be personally responsible for 
making beneficiaries whole for whatever they lost as a result of the fiduciary’s 
mismanagement.140 As such, companies and fiduciaries take extreme precaution to avoid any 
hint of fiduciary breach when it comes to ERISA-regulated plans. 
ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to prioritize the interests of plan participants and 
beneficiaries when making investment decisions for the plan.141 ERISA mandates specific 
fiduciary duties stemming from trust law and requiring fiduciaries to exercise the same standard 
of care and diligence that a prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.142 This is 
called ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence.  ERISA also mandates that fiduciaries must act 
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of 
providing financial benefits.143 This requirement is also known as the fiduciary’s duty of 
loyalty.144 In addition to the duties of prudence and loyalty, the ERISA-regulated fiduciary also 
has the duties to diversify the plan’s investments, follow the terms of a plan, and avoid conflicts 
of interest and statutorily prohibited transactions.145 
Some types of ERISA-regulated plans, including 401(k)s, can be set up so that the 
participants choose where to direct their plan assets from a suite of employer-provided 
investment options. When selecting investment options for a plan such as a 401(k), the plan 
fiduciaries have specific obligations. Fiduciaries must have a “prudent process” that they rely 
upon when selecting investments and service providers, must ensure that fees and other expenses 
are reasonable, must select investments that are both “prudent” and “adequately diversified”, and 
monitor the investment options and service providers to make sure they continue to be 
appropriate choices for the plan.146 
C. ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciaries’ Selection of Plan Investment Options 
If an employer wants to offer an ESG investment option, such as one of the ESG choices 
detailed above, the employer and any other fiduciaries involved in the decision must tread 
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carefully to avoid running afoul of ERISA’s regulations governing investment selection. 
Specifically, fiduciaries need to make sure they do not run afoul of ERISA’s duties of loyalty 
and prudence.  
The duty of loyalty issue is whether the fiduciary is allowed to consider benefits that this 
type of investment option has on anyone other than the beneficiary—is it a violation of the duty 
of exclusive loyalty to the beneficiary if the plan not only benefits the beneficiary and his assets, 
but also benefits a third party, such as the fund manager, or the planet? Does that collateral 
benefit mean that the fiduciary selecting an ESG option for inclusion in the lineup has violated 
ERISA’s duty of loyalty? This is a procedural question—regardless of how positive the financial 
performance of the ESG option is, does the fact that it also inherently benefits a third party make 
it strictly off-limits for an ERISA-regulated plan? 
The second issue is that of the duty of prudence. This issue gets to the investment 
research process the fiduciary engaged in when choosing the investment choice, as well as the 
substantive quality of the specific investment option included in the plan. Is it prudent, or 
financially sound, to include an option in the lineup that only invests in companies that have 
positive ESG impact? Presumably, this issue will depend upon what research the fiduciary 
undertook when choosing the specific option, and how good of a financial investment the 
specific ESG option is. 
1. ERISA’ Duty of Loyalty and ESG Investing 
The first fiduciary duty that comes up when discussing inclusion of ESG funds in a plan’s 
lineup, and the one specifically targeted by the Trump ESG rule,147 is the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. ERISA’s fiduciary duty of loyalty requires plan fiduciaries to act in the best interest of 
their beneficiaries’ plan assets, from an economic perspective. Fiduciaries cannot take into 
account the larger scope of “best interest”, like making a different investment decision that might 
be better for the beneficiaries’ work environment.  
This narrow scope of “best interest” is dubbed “fund-first” by David Webber in his article 
“The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital,” where he criticizes this narrow focus. 148 Webber 
summarizes this understanding of the duty of loyalty as follows: “Under this same view, trustees 
might similarly breach their fiduciary duties by negotiating to protect their participants’ jobs at 
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some cost to return on investment, even if it would improve the investment’s net economic 
benefit to fund participants and beneficiaries.”149 
This article does not seek to criticize this fund-first approach to the duty of loyalty, no 
matter how many good points David Webber brings up in his astute critique. This article simply 
seeks to clarify that, under the duty of loyalty, a fiduciary has a duty to make investment 
decisions that are in the sole interest of the beneficiaries’ assets in the plan. If the fiduciary takes 
other considerations into mind and makes a slightly worse economic decision that has slightly 
more extrinsic favorable impacts, like on the beneficiary’s job security, or on global warming, 
that subjugation of the plan assets to that collateral benefit would be a violation of the fiduciary’s 
duty of loyalty. 
But what if the consideration of collateral benefits does NOT cause the plan or its 
participants to lose money? What if we had a win-win scenario, like that offered by many 
prudent ESG investment options, where a fund's consideration of ESG factors actually led to 
similar or increased economic benefits for the beneficiaries’ assets? 150 Would it be a violation of 
the duty of loyalty if, in addition to being in the best interest of the beneficiary’s assets, a 
fiduciary’s investment decision also had a positive impact on a third party, say, the planet?151 
ERISA case laws answers this question clearly—no. It is not a violation of the duty of 
loyalty to make a decision that is both in the best interest of the beneficiaries' assets and provides 
a collateral benefit to a third party. To establish a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty, the 
fiduciary would have needed to value someone else’s benefits over the benefits to the 
participant’s assets.152 The district court in Donovan v. Walton clarified this point when it wrote 
that ERISA’s duty of loyalty “does not prohibit a party other than a plan's participants and 
beneficiaries from benefitting in some measure from a prudent transaction with the plan. 
Furthermore, by adopting the ‘exclusive purpose’ standard, Congress did not intend to make 
illegal the fact of life that most often a transaction benefits both parties involved.”153 
From a court’s perspective, it doesn’t matter who the third party is—it could even be a 
decision that benefits the actual fiduciary, as was the case in Metzler v. Graham.154 It’s not much 
of a logical jump to assume that it could also be a decision that happens to benefit the planet. As 
long as it is in the best interest of the beneficiaries’ portfolio, precedent would suggest it doesn’t 
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violate the duty of loyalty if it also happens to help the planet. The fiduciary can make an 
investment decision that is good for the planet, as long as it's the best one for the portfolio.  
In his article criticizing ESG investing and arguing for exclusion of ESG funds from 
retirement plans, Bernard Sharfman claimed that investing in ESG plans would inherently violate 
ERISA’s duty of loyalty because of the collateral benefits it would have on society.155 He argued 
that if a fund strategy pursued non-financial goals, such as cleaning up the environment, or 
excluding investments in guns or tobacco, that collateral benefit would violate the sole benefit 
rule and make the fiduciary liable for breach of his duty of loyalty.  
This argument fails to recognize that a fiduciary can do both. If a fiduciary chooses an 
actively managed fund that pursues the highest risk-adjusted return possible by including ESG 
factors in the investment and screening out “bad” ESG companies because of their inherent 
volatility and risk, that fiduciary would not be breaching his duty of loyalty. That fiduciary 
would be following the portfolio management advice that the finance industry is shouting from 
the rooftops: fiscally responsible investing requires analysts to consider the risks posed by 
certain ESG factors and exclude “bad” ESG companies from funds if they pose too big of a risk 
to the funds’ return. 
Trust law professor Susan N. Gary emphasized that prudent selection of an ESG fund 
would not violate a fiduciary’s duty of trust, because “growing evidence suggestions that ESG 
information may improve returns, especially when a longer time horizon is considered.”156 As 
such, she argued in a 2019 article that, “[a]s long as a strategy does not involve sacrificing 
financial returns, then even if the duty of loyalty is defined as the duty to act solely in the 
financial interests of the beneficiaries, the duty of loyalty is not compromised by a direction to 
invest using a strategy that incorporates ESG criteria.”157 
This way of thinking about ESG investing as permissible within the duty of loyalty is 
consistent with the public policy and purpose of ERISA. Congress drafted ERISA to encourage 
employers to establish retirement savings plans.158 ERISA preempts state legislation and offers 
some protection to employers because Congress recognized that too much liability, or too much 
confusion about which law prevails, will dissuade companies from offering retirement plans.159 
Uncertainty and increased liability raise compliance costs, and higher compliance costs of 
benefit plans will necessarily translate to fewer benefit plans.  
Here too, if there is too much liability risk surrounding offering ESG, as under the 
Trump-era rule, employers simply won’t offer it. We see that playing out right now, with only 
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3% of employers offering an ESG option,160 even as supply of and demand for these high-quality 
investment options is exploding.161  
2. ERISA’s Duty of Prudence and ESG 
 The second fiduciary duty that is potentially at play in fiduciary’s wariness towards ESG 
is the duty of prudence.  ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence requires a fiduciary to investigate 
and consider the relevant facts and circumstances of the investment choice. The duty does not 
require a fiduciary to be prescient, or predict the actual outcome of an individual investment 
decision.162 The duty of prudence does require that the fiduciary determine that a particular 
investment is reasonably designed, and take into consideration the risk of loss and opportunity 
for gain, including factors such as the diversification of the plan, the liquidity of the plan, and the 
projected return of the plan.163 This duty basically asks the question, “did the fiduciary do his or 
her due diligence?”  
This duty looks more at the decision-making process, and less at the actual performance 
of the selected investment. The duty of prudence depends on industry norms, and requires the 
fiduciary to do the research and consider the factors that a prudent investor would.164  
 Courts have found a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence when the fiduciary did not 
engage in adequate process. For example, in Katsaros v. Cody, the Second Circuit found there 
was a fiduciary breach of the duty of prudence because the pension fund made a $2 million loan 
to a bank simply relying on a short presentation by the bank and without obtaining an 
independent professional appraisal or analysis of the bank or collateral. There, the fiduciary 
breached his duty of prudence because he did not do enough work to determine that the loan was 
a safe one that would reasonably be repaid to the pension fund.165  
 Another example of a court finding a fiduciary breached his duty of prudence for lack of 
due diligence in the process is Zanditon v. Feinstein, where the fiduciary merely relied upon a 
co-trustee’s advice when selecting a plan and did not independently investigate the plan’s merits. 
Here, he breached his fiduciary duty because he did not do his due diligence in researching the 
plan prior to investing in it.166 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found a fiduciary breached his duty 
of prudence when he agreed to a fee schedule after only discussing it for ten minutes and not 
giving it adequate study.167  
 In order for this failure of process to cause a breach of the duty of prudence, there must 
be a causal link between the failure to investigate and the harm suffered by the plan.168 
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Additionally, if a fiduciary does not engage in the proper research process, but makes a decision 
that another “hypothetical prudent fiduciary” would have also made, that lack of research up 
front also does not rise to the level of breach of a fiduciary’s duty of prudence.169  
 Given courts’ interpretations of a fiduciary’s duty of prudence, and the clear impact of 
ESG factors on a fund’s performance, it seems there is an easy way for fiduciaries to avoid 
liability under their duty of prudence when selecting an ESG fund for the plan lineup. The 
fiduciary simply needs to engage in the same sort of research process he engages in when 
choosing any sort of fund for the lineup. This process should include asking fund managers about 
their strategy, their level of research, their expertise, their performance against a benchmark, 
their fees, etc. As long as other prudent investors are making similar choices (and millions of 
individual Americans and dozens of institutional investors are choosing to invest in ESG funds), 
then a fiduciary need not worry about a beneficiary-instigated or Department of Labor-instigated 
lawsuit for including a climate-friendly investment plan in the lineup. 
Trust law professor Susan N. Gary argues that ESG investing does not violate the duty of 
prudence for these same reasons. In her article entitled “Best Interests in the Long Term: 
Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration,” she argues that the fluid nature of the duty of prudence, 
which changes with industry norms, means that as the financial industry has moved to adopt 
ESG investment practices, the duty of prudence now allows, or even requires, a prudent fiduciary 
to consider those factors as well.170 Her article cited to a United Nations report issued in 
conjunction with the British law firm Freshfield Buckhaus Deringer, which analyzed fiduciary 
duties applicable to investment decision-making and “concluded that integrating ESG 
considerations into investment analysis was ‘clearly permissible’ and ‘arguably required.’”171 
The duty of prudence requires that fiduciaries take the factors into consideration that a 
prudent investor would—and prudent investors are starting to consider ESG factors even in non-
ESG funds. These are important factors that contribute to performance and impact a company’s 
bottom line. Including ESG factors are absolutely part of the process of doing due diligence on a 
company’s valuation and exposure to risk. As cited above, the chief operating and compliance 
officer at a benefits firm explained that ESG considerations are simply “a new way of thinking 
about the extra layer of qualitative due diligence.”172 Additionally, a white paper released by the 
investment management firm Neurberger Merman stated that, “investors now expect that any 
robust investment process should integrate material ESG considerations, and they are 
increasingly seeking to define, measure and enhance the total impact of their investment.”173  
Institutional investors are investing in ESG because it is a good financial strategy. It is 
ludicrous for an ESG Rule to create a presumption that it is imprudent to consider ESG factors, 
when the financial industry is explicitly stating it is imprudent NOT to consider those factors.  
 To reiterate the point above, the current ESG Rule, as it stands, puts a higher burden on 
fiduciaries seeking to include ESG options in the lineup than fiduciaries seeking to include non-
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ESG investments in the lineup. The rule states that fiduciaries must prove the pecuniary nature of 
the ESG factors or avail themselves of the laborious tie-breaker exclusion, in order to avoid the 
risk of litigation. This placement of the burden of proof on the plan fiduciary upfront is directly 
counter to the placement of the burden for any other type of investment, where plan sponsors can 
choose to include any non-ESG fund in the plan, and only need to justify their fulfillment of the 
duties of loyalty and prudence down the line, if they get sued.  
In addition, in an ERISA litigation suit, the burden of proving a fiduciary breached or did 
not breach his duty is almost never on the plan sponsor or the fiduciary!174 The burden of 
proving that the fiduciary breached his duty is on the plan participant, or plaintiff—the fiduciary 
almost never needs to prove it was not a violation of fiduciary duty (with a few rare, fact-specific 
exceptions.)175 Mandating that a fiduciary has the burden of proving that including an ESG fund 
is not a violation of the duty of loyalty is a clear double standard for ESG plans, and it denies 
American investors the opportunity to avail themselves of one of the hottest and fastest growing 
investment vehicles in the industry.  
IV.  PRESIDENT BIDEN SHOULD “BUILD BACK” A “BETTER” ESG RULE 
 The current ESG Rule fails to recognize that employers can carry out ERISA’s goal of 
secure retirement for American workers through offering an ESG option in retirement plan 
lineups. This article suggests two approaches the Department of Labor can take to encourage 
more employers to offer these attractive investment options to their employees. The Department 
of Labor can either (1) rewrite the rule to shift the presumption back to a presumption that ESG 
factors are pecuniary, or economically relevant, or (2) amend pre-existing safe harbor exceptions 
or create a new safe harbor exception for plans that offer an ESG option, as long as they follow 
certain requirements.  
A. Shift the Presumption and Burden Back Where It Belongs 
One approach the Department of Labor could take to explicitly allow employers to offer 
ESG options in their 401(k) lineups would be to rewrite the ESG Rule to make it clear that ESG 
factors should not be presumed to be non-pecuniary. In this scenario, the process for a fiduciary 
to select and include an ESG option in a 401(k) investment lineup would be exactly the same 
process they go through when choosing a non-ESG investment. The fiduciary could on his own, 
or with the help of an investment consultant, consider the plan’s diversification, risk, fee 
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structure, and historical performance relative to a benchmark.176 There would be no additional 
work required upfront if the fiduciary was investigating an ESG option as opposed to a non-ESG 
option. 
Instead of fiduciaries needing to document up front their rationale for believing ESG 
factors to be pecuniary, or to go through the steps of the tie-breaker exception, the re-written rule 
could simply clarify that the Department of Labor presumes ESG factors are pecuniary, the same 
presumption that any other non-ESG fund is afforded. If a beneficiary disagrees, and in the case 
of a certain ESG plan, thinks that the type of ESG considerations in that plan were not 
sufficiently economically relevant to the plan’s performance, the burden would be on the 
beneficiary to prove that point in the course of a lawsuit. 
This presumption and burden shift would remove the double standard for ESG funds that 
currently places the burden on the fiduciary to upfront justify the consideration of ESG factors 
and their relevance to the investment decision. Additionally, this would remove the added 
litigation threat currently present in the ESG Rule which suggests that it is a violation of a 
fiduciary’s duty of prudence to pick an investment option that has collateral benefits to the planet 
(even though, as documented excessively above, these plans are arguably better for the 
beneficiary, and certainly a fiduciary could demonstrate the plan selection was in the best interest 
of the participant.) 
The fiduciary then would have the same duty to monitor the performance of the ESG 
option, just as they have the duty to monitor the performance of any other non ESG fund in the 
plan lineup.177 If the ESG fund did not perform as predicted, or if any non ESG fund did not 
perform as predicted, the fiduciary should remove that fund and restart the research process to 
find a better one. 
 This type of rule would not require a fiduciary to justify up front if a specific ESG fund 
was using ESG characteristics that were pecuniary or not--it would simply care about the same 
things we care about in any plan investment selection: process and performance.  
B. Encourage ESG Investment Inclusion by Creating a Safe Harbor for Lineups with ESG 
 An alternative method that the Department of Labor could pursue is to create a safe 
harbor to encourage plan fiduciaries to include ESG investment options in their plan’s lineup. A 
safe harbor is a way to create an exception to ERISA for plans that meet certain requirements. If 
the plans meet the requirements of safe harbors, they are removed either from some ERISA 
reporting and testing requirements, or in certain cases, removed entirely from ERISA’s 
jurisdiction.  
Safe harbors have the effect of massively lowering the compliance costs for certain types 
of plans. ERISA reporting and compliance testing takes an enormous amount of time and is very 
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costly, so if a company can avoid the time and expense of those reports and tests by complying 
with a certain requirement from a safe harbor, in most cases they will comply with the safe 
harbor. This is a way that Congress or the Department of Labor can encourage plans to be 
drafted in certain ways, by effectively lowering the compliance costs and making it much 
cheaper for an employer to offer a certain kind of benefit plan. Congress and the Department of 
Labor have created a number of safe harbors for certain types of retirement plans, so this would 
not be a deviation from the norm. 
 One example of Congress creating a safe harbor to encourage a new type of retirement 
plan design is the safe harbor for plans that auto-enroll employees in their 401(k) retirement 
savings plans as they qualify, rather than requiring the employees to go through the hassle of 
enrolling themselves.178 If an employee does not want to participate in the plan, they can opt out. 
The idea of auto-enrolling employees in retirement plans as a nudge to get them to participate in 
higher numbers, and thus save more for retirement, came from behavioral economist Richard 
Thaler, who eventually won the Nobel Prize for his research on behavioral economics and how 
employers could adjust plan design to automatically encourage more employees to save.179 
Recognizing that auto-enrollment was a desirable feature for retirement plans, Congress 
created a safe harbor in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.180 The safe harbor provided that 
401(k) plans with an auto-enroll feature meeting certain requirements are exempt from the 
nondiscrimination rules and tests for deferrals and matching contributions, and are exempt from 
certain “top heavy” rules.181 Unsurprisingly, retirement plan providers jumped at the chance to 
avoid the expensive and time-consuming nondiscrimination and top heavy rules, and exempted 
themselves from those rules by adjusting their plans to auto-enroll participants. 
As a result of the safe harbor for plans that auto-enroll beneficiaries, plans with an auto-
enroll feature doubled over the course of ten years, from 35.6% in 2007 to 59.7% in 2016.182 
This is not surprising. When regulation makes a certain type of plan construction cheaper, 
companies will adopt that type of plan construction. And, in this case, adopting this type of plan 
construction had massive positive impacts on plan participation and retirement saving--auto 
enrollment nearly doubled plan participation and successfully enrolled participants who 
otherwise would not have saved for retirement.183 A Vanguard study from 2015 found that in 
recent years, auto-enrollment has more than doubled plan participation rates, from 42% without 
auto-enroll to more than 91% participation with an auto-enroll feature. This is an example of 
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Congress intentionally lowering the compliance costs of ERISA for certain plans in order to 
encourage plans to be designed in that desirable way.  
Other types of safe harbors completely shield fiduciaries from liability under certain 
conditions. The ERISA Section 404(c) safe harbor, for example, shields fiduciaries from liability 
for a beneficiary’s investment decision that leads to plan losses. This safe harbor is also known 
as “the large menu defense.” The 404(c) safe harbor states that as long as the plan offers a broad 
range of investment options, allows the beneficiary to control their investments, and sufficiently 
educates the beneficiary about the investment options, the fiduciary is not liable for an individual 
beneficiary’s investment choice that leads to investment losses.184 This means that, if a fiduciary 
sets out a large enough menu of investment choices in a lineup and properly educates the 
participant about the options, and the participant chooses an option that ends up performing 
poorly, the participant should not prevail in a lawsuit against the fiduciary to recover the loss of 
his plan assets.185  
This safe harbor may sound like it already protects fiduciaries from liability for including 
an ESG plan in their lineup, as long as there are enough investment options in the lineup and the 
fiduciary provides enough information to educate the participant about his options.  
The Department of Labor, however, explicitly explained that the 404(c) defense does not 
apply to plan investment selection decisions.186 The Department of Labor clarified that the 
404(c) shield cannot be used as a defense against an allegation of breach of the duty of prudence, 
and investment selection choices fall within the duty of prudence. Plan investments still must be 
prudently selected, and 404(c) will not protect a fiduciary who does not select good investment 
options. 404(c) only protects a fiduciary if one of those prudently selected investments ends up 
with poor performance, and the participant tries to sue the fiduciary for having invested in that 
option as opposed to one of the plan’s other prudent options.187 
Some courts have disagreed with the agency’s interpretation of the 404(c) safe harbor, 
and argue that the 404(c) protection should extend to fiduciary decisions in selecting plan 
investments. The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that the 404(c) large menu 
defense does apply to protect fiduciary decisions made at the investment selection level.188 Many 
of these cases have centered on the issue of excessive fees, where beneficiaries sued the fiduciary 
for losses to their plan assets due to an allegedly excessive fee structure. In numerous cases, 
these circuit courts have held that the 404(c) large menu defense applies, and that fiduciaries are 
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not liable as long as they took the steps required to avail themselves of 404(c), namely offering 
enough options, enough choice, and sufficient investor education.189 
1. Expand the 404(c) Safe Harbor to Shield Fiduciaries from ESG-related Liability 
One simple type of safe harbor that the Department of Labor could set up to encourage 
fiduciaries to offer an ESG option would be to simply amend the 404(c) safe harbor to include 
protections for a fiduciary’s decision to include an ESG option. This could be done in one of two 
ways.  
First, the Department of Labor could retract their prior regulation stating that 404(c) does 
not apply to plan investment selection, and instead adopt the position taken by the Third, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that it does protect decisions at the plan level. The problem with 
this broad expansion of the safe harbor, however, is that it may end up protecting plan 
investment decisions that the Labor Department does not want to protect, such as choosing 
investment options that have excessive fees. It is not targeted specifically at including ESG 
options, so this broad safe harbor may do more harm than good. 
A narrower expansion of the 404(c) safe harbor could specifically only extend the safe 
harbor to the decision to include an ESG option. The 404(c) regulation could be rewritten to state 
that this safe harbor does not extend to any decision made at the plan investment selection phase, 
except for the decision to add a prudently selected ESG plan. This would still require that the 
ESG investment be prudently selected, and would not shield the fiduciary from liability for 
picking a “bad” ESG investment. It would, however, shield a fiduciary from liability if they 
followed the steps to pick a prudent ESG investment (detailed above in the duty of prudence 
section), and then for whatever reason the investment did not perform as expected, and the 
participant wanted to sue to recoup losses. 
This narrow expansion of the 404(c) large menu defense safe harbor to protect a 
fiduciary’s decision to include an ESG option would lower the compliance costs of including 
ESG, and would be expected to lead to more ESG investments getting added to retirement plan 
lineups. Fiduciaries would just need to follow the 404(c) instructions and then could rest assured 
they would be protected in case of plan losses down the line. If a plan provides a broad menu of 
options, one of which is a prudently selected ESG investment option, a fiduciary could raise a 
complete 404(c) defense to a beneficiary suing for plan losses they claimed were due to the 
fiduciary’s categorical selection of an ESG option. If beneficiaries could no longer sue a 
fiduciary for simply choosing an ESG option, fiduciaries would be encouraged, or at least not 
discouraged, to include an ESG option in their plan lineup. 
2. Draft a New Safe Harbor Explicitly for ESG Investment Options 
An alternative to expanding the 404(c) safe harbor defense to include the plan selection 
of an ESG investment could be to draft an entirely new safe harbor that applies only to ESG 
investments. This might be a more desirable approach for the Department of Labor to take, rather 
than just expanding 404(c) protection to ESG investments, since an ESG-specific safe harbor 
could be drafted in a way that takes ESG-specific investing into consideration. For example, the 
safe harbor could include specific process requirements that the fiduciary would need to do 
upfront in order to qualify for the safe harbor and remove the risk of litigation. There might be a 
requirement that the ESG fund have a certain number of years of outperformance of a non-ESG 
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benchmark, to prove that the choice of this fund is in the sole economic interest of the 
beneficiary, and that the beneficiary’s assets would not be taking a hit relative to how they’d 
perform in a non-ESG fund.  Also, it could put certain limitations on the type of ESG 
investments that could be included, perhaps only allowing a safe harbor for ESG funds that are 
actively managed, rather than passively managed, since ESG investment research seems to 
indicate that actively managed ESG funds perform better than passively managed ESG funds.190  
The problem with the Department of Labor creating a prescriptive safe harbor for certain 
types of ESG investment process choices is that it assumes that the Department of Labor is in a 
better position to mandate the requirements for a good ESG fund better than the fiduciary 
himself. Creating a rule where the Department of Labor, rather than the fiduciary, sets the 
process and parameters for which ESG funds are eligible for inclusion in the safe harbor not only 
presumes the agency knows better than the fiduciary, but it also risks becoming an inflexible 
regulation that is set in stone in the Federal Register. This safe harbor could become too difficult 
to change and update as the investment research changes and certain ESG strategies end up 
performing better than others.  It also continues the differential treatment of ESG funds, which 
could stigmatize them. 
While this kind of detailed and prescriptive safe harbor may give the Department of 
Labor an illusion of control and feelings of certainty that only “safe” ESG investments will 
qualify for protection under the safe harbor, this approach does risk becoming antiquated and 
resistant to change, as the updating and amending of rules takes agency attention, time, and 
coordination.  
Ultimately, there are pros and cons for each approach the Department of Labor could take 
when updating the ESG Rule. This article sets out the argument in favor of updating the ESG 
Rule to encourage employers to offer ESG options in their lineups, and sets out a number of 
recommendations for the agency’s consideration. The Department of Labor could completely 
rewrite the rule, amend pre-existing safe harbors, or draft a new safe harbor. The need for a 
regulatory change is clear, but various paths are plausible. 
C. Work in Tandem with Other Government Agencies 
 No matter which path the Department of Labor chooses to follow, it would be a good 
idea for the Labor Department to work hand-in-hand with other agencies attending to ESG 
regulation. In particular, the Department of Labor should work with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which has also recently stated their intent to regulate heavily in the area of ESG.  
The current SEC, which is technically an independent agency191 but has a chairperson 
appointed by the President,192 has made multiple moves early in the Biden Administration to 
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signal its desire to push for sustainable investing. In early March of 2021, the SEC created a new 
Climate and ESG Task Force193 and throughout the late winter and early spring, filled up its 
ranks with environmentally-conscious new leaders.194 These moves signal an enhanced focus on 
regulating corporations’ environmental impacts.195 Specifically, the SEC intends to standardize 
ESG disclosures so that investors can accurately assess and value corporate exposure to climate 
change.196 
The current lack of standardized disclosures makes it difficult for investors and 
consumers to truly understand the environmental impact a company has, or the company’s 
exposure to climate change risks.197 It also allows some companies to engage in “greenwashing,” 
where they make their environmental impact look more positive than it really is by manipulating 
what metrics they are using to report ESG impacts.198 Uncertainty about the extent or 
comprehensiveness of a company’s ESG disclosures makes it difficult for investors to trust they 
are getting the full picture of a company’s ESG exposure or impact. More than half of the 
respondents to a BlackRock survey cited concerns about “poor quality or availability of ESG 
data and analytics” as the biggest barrier to engaging in sustainable investing.199 
Standardized and mandatory ESG disclosures will give investors a better understanding 
of how companies really stack up with their climate change risk and ESG impact. Robust 
disclosures will allow ESG investors to better select which companies truly belong in an ESG 
fund. This increased disclosure and proper valuation of risk and impact will allow employees to 
better trust that their assets will be safe in an ESG fund.  The SEC and the Labor Department 
should coordinate their efforts to achieve maximum impact, by allowing for proper valuation of 
climate risk, minimizing greenwashing, and encouraging the investment of retirement plan assets 
in sustainable businesses. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Department of Labor’s most recent anti-ESG ESG Rule stands in the way of 
consumer demand for access to sustainable investments. It is the number one, if not only, barrier 
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to Americans investing their retirement assets in greener, cleaner investment options that align 
with their values.  
This article argues that a simple regulatory change will have significant impacts on 
retirement savings and sustainable investments at the margin. But saving and investing at the 
margin still matters. Given the nature of compound interest, if a 28-year-old millennial employee 
ends up saving an additional $100/month, pre-tax, because of a desirable investment option in 
her retirement account, that additional savings will compound to an additional $399,447.78 at 
retirement, if she retires at 65 and we assume an annual return of 10%. Marginal regulatory 
changes with marginal impacts on retirement savings behavior have outsized impacts on 
retirement security. 
 
